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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS: ADVERSELY
IMPACTING UPON JUDICIAL FAIRNESS
ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY*
A criminal defendant is entitled to "a public tribunal free of
prejudice, passion, [and] excitement." 1
In 1982, New York State amended Article 390 of the Criminal
Procedure Law,' and incorporated a Victim Impact Statement
("VIS") as one discretionary aspect of a pre-sentence report. Fur-
thermore, Articles 380 and 390 were significantly affected by New
York's 1992 Session Laws.' Section 380.50 now provides that at a
felony sentencing "the victim [has] the right to make a statement
with regard to any matter relevant to the question of sentence.",
The key issue addressed in this article is whether the addition of
both oral and written VIS's has enhanced or encumbered justice.
Although this author can appreciate the inclusion of the victim's
version of the crime in sentences that are a result of plea bargains,
I am of the opinion that in most cases, the VIS is at the least un-
necessary and, at worst, prejudicial to the defendant. The use of a
VIS at sentencing raises a myriad of constitutional issues and
should therefore be restricted.
Moreover, VIS's potentially create a situation in which sentenc-
ing length may be determined by the eloquence and social stand-
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Criminal Law Center, Fordham
University School of Law. I would like to extend my appreciation to Ian Ratner, a third
year law student, for his assistance on this article.
1 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940)).
N.Y. CaIM. PROc. LAW § 390.30 (McKinney 1983), amended by Compensation of Crime
Victims by Criminals-Repeal of Son of Sam Law, ch. 618, §§ 3, 4, [1992] N.Y. Laws
1669 (McKinney).
' See, e.g., N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 380.50 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992), amended by
Victim's Right to Speak at Sentencing, ch. 307, §§ 1, 2, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1005 (McKin-
ney); Id. § 390.30, amended by Compensation of Crime Victims by Criminals-Repeal of
Son of Sam Law, ch. 618, §§ 3, 4, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1669 (McKinney).
Id. § 380.50(2)(b).
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ing of the victim rather than the severity of the offense and the
specific underlying facts of the crime. This is particularly true if
the victim seeks restitution via the criminal justice system,5 or in-
tends to start a civil action against the defendant. In such cases,
the victim might foreseeably receive the advice of private counsel
before making an impact statement to the probation department
or to the court.
The sentence imposed by a judge should be based upon the evi-
dence deduced at trial. While, on occasion, a VIS may enlighten
the sentencing judge, as I have previously stated, I contend that
VIS's are generally unnecessary, if not prejudicial. A judge may
rightfully presume that a victim, or the victim's family, will want
the defendant to receive the maximum sentence allowed by law.
In the tragic Happy Land Social Club fire in New York on
March 25, 1990, defendant Julio Gonzalez was sentenced to the
maximum of twenty-five years to life prior to the Section 390
amendments.' This sentence would have been imposed without
the then-discretionary use of a VIS. Nonetheless, a VIS was pre-
pared by the New York City Probation Department from inter-
views with the victims' families. One victim's parent quoted in the
report stated, "[I] wish someone would chop pieces of flesh out of
Gonzalez['s] body, pour gasoline, [and] set him on fire."17 I sympa-
thize with this mother's loss. I still contend, however, that victim
impact statements of this nature are extremely inflammatory and
prejudicial. In addition, the present compulsory nature of the pre-
sentence report encourages sentences based on passion rather
than a well thought-out penalty which fits the severity of the
crime, and the manner in which it was effectuated.
Part One of this article will analyze Article 390 of the Criminal
Procedure Law, which outlines the content and scope of pre-sen-
tence reports in general. Part Two will discuss victim impact state-
ments in detail. Part Three will analyze the history of the admissi-
bility of VIS's in New York, and Part Four will address the United
States Supreme Court's holdings on the subject. Part Five will ex-
' See id. § 390.30(3)(b) (requiring victim to be informed of right to seek restitution and
reparation).
' See Ralph Blumenthal, 87 Die in Blaze at Illegal Club, Police Arrest Ejected Patron, Worst
New York Fire Since 1911, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 26, 1990, at B5. The fire was set by Julio Gonza-
lez after an argument with his former girlfriend who worked at the club. Id.
' Rose Marie Arce, The Victims Left Behind, NEWSDAY (New York ed.), Sept. 20, 1991, at
7 (quoting mother of Isabel Lopez Romero, one of the victims of the fire).
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amine the impetus for amending criminal law to provide for VIS.
Finally, in Part Six, I will argue that VIS's, as currently devised,
are riddled with the potential for unduly influencing a judge in
the sentencing process..
I. PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS
Criminal Procedure Law section 390.20 requires that a sentenc-
ing judge order a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant and
receive a written report of the investigation from the probation
department. Specifically, the court may not pronounce sentence
on any felony conviction without first receiving the report., Sec-
ondly, the report requirement is also mandatory in those misde-
meanor cases that would entail a sentence of either probation, a
prison term of more than ninety days, or consecutive prison terms
aggregating over ninety days.9 The court also has the discretion to
order a pre-sentence report for any offense it wishes, regardless of
what sentence it might impose.' 0
The purpose of the pre-sentence report is to apprise the judge
of both the facts underlying the commission of the offense, and
the background and character of the defendant. Section 390.30 of
the Criminal Procedure Law" describes the specific types of infor-
mation which must be included in the report. First, the report
should embody the "circumstances attending the commission of
the offense, the defendant's history of delinquency or criminality,
and the defendant's social history, employment history, family sit-
8 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 390.20(1) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992). This section states:
"In any case where a person is convicted of a felony, the court must order a pre-sentence
investigation of the defendant and it may not pronounce sentence until it has received a
written report of such investigation." Id.
Id. § 390.20(2). This section states, in pertinent part:
Where a person is convicted of a misdemeanor a pre-sentence report is not required,
but the court may not pronounce any of the following sentences unless it has or-
dered a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant and has received a written re-
port thereof:
(a) A sentence of probation except where ... [probation has been agreed upon by
the parties];
(b) A sentence of imprisonment for a term in excess of ninety days;
(c) Consecutive sentences of imprisonment with terms aggregating more than
ninety days.
Id.
10 Id. § 390.20(3). "For purposes of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, order a
pre-sentence investigation and report in any case, irrespective of whether such investiga-
tion and report is required by subdivision one or two." Id.
Id. § 390.30.
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uation, economic status, education, and personal habits."1 Sec-
ond, the report may include any additional information which the
investigating agency deems relevant to the question of sentenc-
ing.18 Third, the report must incorporate any available informa-
tion that documents the defendant's mental or physical state." Fi-
nally, the probation department must include a VIS in the pre-
sentence report "unless it appears that such information would be
of no relevance to the recommendation or court disposition.'
II. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
If the court deems that a VIS is an essential element of the pre-
sentence report, the report must include:
[A]n analysis of the victim's version of the offense, the extent
of injury or economic loss and the actual out-of-pocket loss to
the victim and the views of the victim relating to disposition
including the amount of restitution and reparation sought by
the victim after the victim has been informed of the right to
seek restitution and reparation, subject to the availability of
such information. 6
In the case of a homicide or where the victim is incapacitated, the
victim's family may provide the necessary information.'
In rare instances, the VIS may provide the sentencing court
with relevant and germane information. However, once a plea is
offered by the prosecution and accepted by the defendant, the use
of a VIS may often result in a waste of increasingly scarce judicial
resources and prejudice to the rights of the defendant. Unless the
VIS substantially differs from, or augments the facts presented to
the sentencing judge via the prosecution, the defendant, and the
probation department's pre-sentence report, a VIS seems to de-
tract from, rather than add to, the neutrality and fairness of the
sentencing process. The use of the VIS thus creates the potential
for a judge to be swayed by the statements of a sympathetic and
eloquent victim, thereby imposing a higher sentence on one de-
" Id. § 390.30(1).
13 Id.
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 390.30(2) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992).
Id. § 390.30(3)(b).
16 Id.
17 Id.
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fendant, while another defendant, having had the good fortune to
have perpetrated a crime against a destitute, less eloquent, or less
publicized victim, could receive a lighter sentence.
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF VIS's IN NEW YORK
The following examination of recent case law highlights two ar-
eas where the inclusion of a VIS is especially problematic: the use
of a written VIS versus an oral VIS, and the use of a VIS as the
sole impetus behind a refusal to impose a sentence previously
agreed upon by the prosecutor, the defendant, and the court
itself.
As stated in sections I and II, Article 390 of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law provides for the inclusion of a written
VIS in the pre-sentence report submitted by the probation depart-
ment.18 Furthermore, the statute provides that the VIS be made
available to the defendant "not less than one court day prior to
sentencing."19 This latter provision effectively thwarts defense
counsel's ability to rebut an inaccurate or misleading statement.
Further, the recent amendments 0 permit the victim to testify in
person at the sentencing hearing."
In People v. Julia,22 a 1972 case which preceded the VIS amend-
ments, the Appellate Division, Second Department, followed the
intent of the New York State Legislature and prevented oral state-
ments by the victim at sentencing. The court reasoned that the
"8 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (describing requirements of report).
19 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.50(2)(a).
'0 See Victim's Right to Speak at Sentencing, ch. 307, §§ 1, 2, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1005
(McKinney) (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 380.50, 390.50); Compensation of Crime
Victims by Criminals-Repeal of Son of Sam Law, ch. 618, §§ 3, 4, [1992] N.Y. Laws
1669 (McKinney) (amending N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 390.30).
" See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 380.50(2)(b) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992), amended by
Victim's Right to Speak at Sentencing, ch. 307, § 1, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1003-04 (McKin-
ney). This section states, in pertinent part:
If the defendant is being sentenced for a felony the court, if requested at least ten
days prior to the sentencing date, shall accord the victim the right to make a state-
ment with regard to any matter relevant to the question of sentence. The court shall
notify the defendant no less than seven days prior to sentencing of the victim's in-
tent to make a statement at sentencing. If the defendant does not receive timely
notice pursuant to this subdivision, the defendant may request a reasonable
adjournment.
Id.
*2 40 A.D.2d 560, 333 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1972), modified on other grounds, 43 A.D.2d 578,
349 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2d Dep't 1973), affd, 36 N.Y.2d 814, 331 N.E.2d 680, 370 N.Y.S.2d
898, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
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Legislature sought to prevent oral victim impact statements at
sentencing so as not to "becloud the judicial atmosphere and to
unbalance the . . . process of sentence imposition. 123 To allow
oral statements at sentencing would transform the sentencing pro-
cess into an emotional battleground devoid of constitutional safe-
guards. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, a criminal
defendant is entitled to "a public tribunal free of prejudice, pas-
sion [and] excitement." '24
In People v. McCarthy,25 a 1987 case which preceded the 1992
VIS amendments, a homicide victim's parents petitioned the court
for permission to make an oral statement at the sentencing of the
defendant. They felt that a written VIS could not adequately con-
vey their loss and the lasting effect that the crime would have on
their family. Although sympathetic to the family's position, the
court noted the then-contrary legislative intent behind sections
380.50 and 390.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law, reiterated the
logic of Julia, and denied their request. 6 While the court's ration-
ale is persuasive to me, the New York State Legislature disagreed.
The 1992 New York State Session Laws now specifically permit
such oral statements to be made.2" This amendment will result in
nothing less than a verdict imposed in a courtroom atmosphere
charged with emotion and drama and pandering to the me-
dia-all to satisfy that segment of the public which thirsts for the
blood of those convicted of crime.
Prior to the 1992 Session Law amendments, some courts had
already allowed the victim to make an oral statement at sentenc-
2 Id. at 561, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 980; see also People v. McCarthy, 136 Misc. 2d 623, 624-
25, 519 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (St. Lawrence County Ct. 1987) (denying application of victim's
parents to make oral statement at sentencing hearing but allowing written victim impact
statement); cf People v. Branshaw, 177 A.D.2d 1028, 1028, 578 N.Y.S.2d 45, 45 (4th
Dep't 1991) (holding error harmless when court allowed murder victim's mother to speak
at sentencing hearing), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 918, 590 N.E.2d 1206, 582 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1992); People v. Raucci, 136 A.D.2d 48, 50, 525 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (prosecutor's breach
of plea bargain agreement to make no recommendations at sentencing entitled defendant
to withdraw plea or be resentenced), affd, 153 A.D.2d 1013, 545 N.Y.S.2d 630 (3d Dep't
1988), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 951, 549 N.E.2d 488, 550 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1989).
"" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940)).
25 136 Misc. 2d 623, 519 N.Y.S.2d 118 (St. Lawrence County Ct. 1987).
26 Id. at 624, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 118-19 (citingJulia, 40 A.D.2d at 561, 333 N.Y.S.2d at
980).
"7 See Victim's Right to Speak at Sentencing, ch. 307, § 1, 2, [1992] N.Y. Laws 1005
(McKinney) (allowing oral VIS at sentencing) amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 380.50.
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ing. In People v. Sales,'8 the probation department failed to in-
clude a VIS in their pre-sentence report, claiming that they were
unable to locate the victim. 29 Upon being informed by the District
Attorney that her attacker would probably be sentenced to one
year imprisonment on his guilty plea to the charge of robbery, the
victim petitioned for, and was granted, permission to address the
court.3 0 Based on the victim's articulate description of the specific
impact which the robbery had on her personal and professional
life, the court decided to offer the defendant the choice of a
prison sentence of one and one-third to four years or an opportu-
nity to withdraw his plea.8 1
Sales demonstrated the prejudicial effect that an oral impact
statement can have on the imposition of a sentence. Only in those
rare cases where a VIS substantially augments other material con-
tained in the probation department's pre-sentence report should it
be allowed to be a factor in sentence. These New York trial
courts, as it appears in hindsight, foresaw the public demand (or
what they believed to be the public demand) to increase the impo-
sition of harsh sentences.
This is not to suggest that a judge is always bound to fulfill his
originally proposed disposition of the case. As articulated by the
New York Court of Appeals in People v. Selikoff,3 every plea is
conditional on the information available to the court at that
time.3 If subsequent information indicates that the promised sen-
tence is inappropriate, the court has the discretion to depart from
the originally promised sentence and either impose a different one
or offer the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea. But
often the distinction between new information and a reiteration of
a victim's anguish, or a family's grief, is blurred.
Some courts have even maintained that a written VIS, by itself,
should be allowed to become the sole basis for a sentencing judge
to reconsider his promised sentence or to vacate the original plea.
In People v. Andrews,"4 the Appellate Division, Third Department,
23 129 Misc. 2d 731, 493 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985).
20 Id.
31 Id. at 731, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
3' Id. at 732-34, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 946-47.
3' 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975).
Is Id. at 237-38, 318 N.E.2d at 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
U 155 A.D.2d 779, 548 N.Y.S.2d 91 (3d Dep't 1989).
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basing their decision on promissory estoppel, held that the district
attorney's extensive comments about the contents of the VIS did
not violate a prosecutor's promise to refrain from making sentenc-
ing recommendations to the court. 6 Similarly, in People v.
Credidio,6 the Appellate Division, Second Department, remanded
a portion of the trial court's decision which based the amount of
restitution payable by the defendant solely upon statements made
by the victim in the VIS. These cases seem to condemn both the
very purpose of a pre-sentence report and the neutrality of the
sentencing process.
IV. VIS's AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
In 1987, the Supreme Court, in Booth v. Maryland,3 7 announced
that "the introduction of a VIS at the sentencing phase of a capi-
tal murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment." 8 The Court
stated, "[we thus reject the contention that the presence or ab-
sence of emotional distress of the victim's family, or the victim's
personal characteristics, are proper sentencing considerations" in
a capital case. 9 In 1989, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, reaffirmed
Booth in South Carolina v. Gathers.40 The Court invalidated a sen-
tence because oral statements made during the sentencing phase
by the prosecuting attorney were directed at the "personal quali-
ties" of the victim.
4 1
However, in the 1991 case of Payne v. Tennessee,"2 the realigned
court overruled both Booth and Gathers, concluding that the
Eighth Amendment no longer provided a "per se bar" to victim
impact statements at sentencing hearings.'3 Clearly, the Court de-
cided that VIS's are appropriate at sentencing hearings when a
jury is determining the sentence. 4' However, in New York, the
35 Id. at 780, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92.
36 141 A.D.2d 661, 529 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 1044, 531
N.E.2d 663, 534 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1988).
87 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
I' ld. at 509.
39 Id. at 507.
40 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
" Id. at 811.
41 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
48 Id.
4 See, e.g., People v. Mickle, 814 P.2d 290, 324-35 (Cal. 1991) (In Bank) (upholding
introduction of VIS in capital sentencing while recognizing that Payne not binding on state
courts); see also Michael Moline, Court Upholds Death Sentence, UPI, Nov. 25, 1991, available
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responsibility of determining sentence is on the judge rather than
the jury. Additionally, capital punishment is not an alternative in
New York State for any crime. Thus, the circumstances that gave
rise to the Payne decision currently do not exist in New York.
However, the trend in the United States Supreme Court is mir-
rored by the trend in New York statutes.
V. EXAMINATION OF IMPETUS FOR AMENDMENTS
At the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws [hereinafter the "Conference"], chaired locally by
Norman Greene, it was advocated that a change in the laws re-
garding victim impact statements be made. Pursuant to the pro-
posed statute, "A victim, or a member of the victim's immediate
family, may present a written impact statement or, at the individ-
ual's option, appear personally at the sentence proceeding and
present the statement orally." ' When I began analyzing this
problem I noted that we were not far away from a scenario that
would be, at best, emotionally charged and, at worst, create the
"carnival atmosphere" which the Supreme Court has declared vi-
olates defendants' constitutionally mandated rights.46 The carnival
has now come to town. This problem is further exacerbated by
the presence of television cameras in the courtroom as permitted
by a number of states, including New York. 47
At the Conference, Maria Imperial, general counsel to the Vic-
tim Services Agency of New York, spoke of the need to "em-
power the victim" by expanding the use of victim statements. One
way of achieving this goal, she urged, would be to permit victims,
and/or their families, to make oral statements at the time of sen-
tence. The New York Legislature granted Ms. Imperial's wishes
this summer. Other jurisdictions also permit oral VIS's, as did the
state of Minnesota in the sentencing of serial killer Jeffrey
Dahmer. What ensued was a dismal scene with family members
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Justice Stanley Mosk of California stated, "My analysis
has shown that the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family is generally imma-
terial." Id.
" UNIFORM VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT § 19(a) (Proposed Official Draft Oct. 18, 1991).
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (referring to presence of press in
courtroom).
"' See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 218(1). "[T]he chief judge of the state or his designee may au-
thorize an experimental program in which presiding trial judges, in their discretion, may
permit audio-visual coverage of civil and criminal court proceedings, including trials." Id.
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uncontrollably venting their anger. As the Supreme Court stated
in Estes v. Texas,4 8 a criminal defendant is entitled to "judicial se-
renity and calm" in the courtroom."9
Ms. Imperial insists that "contrary to Professor Abramovsky's
belief, a judge should not presume that a victim or the victim's
family would want the defendant to receive the maximum sen-
tence allowed by law.""' But in light of statements such as "I wish
someone would . . . pour gasoline [over the defendant and] set
him on fire,"'5 1 is it presumptuous for a judge to conclude that a
victim, or a victim's family, would want anything less than the
maximum sentence? Furthermore, Ms. Imperial cites a study of
rape victims which showed that a sense of participation is more
critical to a victim than how severely the defendant is punished.
Yet, is the criminal justice system to encourage participation of
the victim at the expense of impartiality?
VI. AGAINST STATEMENTS
The New York Legislature continues to react to the base inter-
ests of a society traumatized by crime.52 There is little doubt, how-
ever, that the position of a member of society is significantly
changed if that member's child is accused or convicted of an of-
fense. It is at this point he seeks the protection traditionally af-
forded a defendant by the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions. He
shudders at the thought that sentencing could be dictated in con-
formance with what a newspaper or tabloid television broadcast
finds appealing and entertaining to its audience. Sentencing
should not be based on what shows like A Current Affair, Hard
Copy, and Inside Edition find sufficiently titillating to their viewers.
The sentencing process is no less significant to a defendant than
other stages in the proceeding. It is nothing less than folly to safe-
guard a defendant's rights throughout the proceeding (both pre-
" 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (holding defendant deprived of right to due process under Four-
teenth Amendment when media televised his notorious trial).
" Id. at 536.
80 Maria Imperial, A Contrasting View of Victims' Rights, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15, 1992, at 2, col.
6.
61 See Arce, supra note 7, at 7 (quoting mother of victim of Happy Land Social Club
Fire).
" See supra notes 3-5, 8-17 and accompanying text (discussing 1992 Session Law amend-
ments to New York Criminal Procedure Law).
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trial and trial), only to succumb to a sentence demanded by a re-
venge-starved family at the very end. If victims' oral statements
detail a horrific ordeal, a judge may well consider how his constit-
uency will react to the sentence he imposes, rather than how he
discharges the duties by which he is bound, namely discretion and
neutrality.
At a recent forum at the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, I presented several arguments against the use of VIS's
at sentencing. The majority of the distinguished panel and audi-
ence vehemently opposed this viewpoint. They said that restrict-
ing the content and/or manner of presentation of victim impact
statements would have a substantial negative impact on the effec-
tiveness of the sentencing process.
Now the use of a VIS has been expanded. It is contended that,
in light of the prosecutor's role as the representative of the victim,
the use of VIS's unnecessarily encroach upon the due process
rights of the defendant. Furthermore, it violates the notion of
equal protection under the law.
Pursuant to section 390.30(3)(b) of the New York Criminal Pro-
cedure Law, a VIS shall contain "an analysis of the victim's ver-
sion of the offense." 5 Such an analysis is likely to contain state-
ments that were either inadmissible at trial or based solely upon
opinion and emotion. In a recent assault case, the VIS contained
the victim's claim that "if the blade had struck a few millimeters
to the left, [I] would be paralyzed, and if the blade had been an
inch longer, [I] would probably be dead."'" Exaggerated state-
ments such as this are often inadmissible during trial. While I sym-
pathize with the victim, such statements are often unsubstantiated
and are relatively irrefutable by the defense. A defendant is enti-
tled to due process throughout his case. As the Supreme Court
has stated, "the sentencing phase is a critical stage of the criminal
proceeding at which . . . [the defendant] . . . is entitled to" his
constitutionally mandated rights.5
Another argument for the restriction of victim impact state-
" N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 390.30 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992), amended by Compen-
sation of Crime Victims by Criminals-Repeal of Son of Sam Law, ch. 618, § 3, 4, [1992]
N.Y. Laws 1669 (McKinney).
" Paul Langner, Black Youth Gets 9 to 10 Years in Racial Assault Conviction, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 6, 1991, at 36.
" Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
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ments is that the prosecutor adequately serves as the victim's rep-
resentative at trial. The role of the prosecutor is to "serve the
People of New York," and in reality, represents the interests of
the victim. For example, a prosecutor often consults with the vic-
tim regarding the punishment to be sought. Therefore the prose-
cutor's statements at the time of sentencing should suffice. A writ-
ten pre-sentence report prepared by the probation department is
also more than sufficient. Nevertheless, the written VIS was intro-
duced into the New York Criminal Procedure Law in 1982." As I
commented earlier, this already prejudiced defendants. But appar-
ently this view was not shared by the legislature. The question is
"Why?" Why is it that a written statement will no longer suffice?
Is the judge not to be entrusted with a written document? Must he
be reminded in open court lest he forget? I do not think that
these were the underlying reasons. An oral statement was permit-
ted not to educate a judge but to put him on the spot. If he did
not listen to an impassioned plea in open court, he would be
deemed not only impartial but inhuman. How could he dismiss
the tears of agony? What was he, a coddler of criminals? In a
crime-infested society is he, perhaps the utmost of taboos, soft on
crime?
The final argument against the newly expanded VIS in sentenc-
ing is that it violates equal protection under the law. Justice
should not be based on the victim's eloquence, financial position,
or family's presence but on the severity of the crime. It is no less a
crime to attack one who is illiterate, poor or without a family.
Why should one life be given greater value than any other? Re-
garding the eloquence of the victim, a VIS prepared by one with a
greater command of the English language will be more persuasive.
A wealthy victim is more likely to obtain private counsel to assist
in the preparation of a victim impact statement. A statement pre-
pared by an attorney is bound to be more thorough and persua-
sive to a judge than that prepared by a layman. Finally, in the case
of a homicide or where the victim is unable to prepare a victim
impact statement, a victim without family ties will likely have no
one "who cares" to speak for him at sentencing. In each case, the
value of the victim impact statements is manipulated by external
factors. The victim impact statement allows sentencing to be
" See supra note 2.
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based on the extraneous factors concerning the victim, including
statements that would never be admissible at trial. All victims
should be entitled to equal justice.
CONCLUSION
Unless the probation department can demonstrate that the facts
as portrayed by the prosecution, defense counsel, and pre-sen-
tence report are insufficient to apprise the judge of all the factors
necessary to impose sentence, there is no need for a VIS. Conse-
quently, the inclusion of a VIS should be the exception rather
than the rule. Only in those cases where the totality of the circum-
stances are substantially and materially augmented by the VIS
should it be used. It is imperative that the sentencing process be
the product of a neutral and detached magistrate, not the product
of a victim's statement motivated either by revenge, potential pe-
cuniary gain, or emotional trauma.
While most defense attorneys question the propriety or need
for victim impact statements at sentencing, it is evident that the
retraction of these laws is unlikely. Therefore, the judiciary
should take it upon themselves to prevent the expansion of, and
should limit the content of, victim impact statements. This safe-
guard will prevent the creation of a "carnival" atmosphere, while
preserving the constitutionally mandated rights of the criminal
defendant.
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